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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants Randy Mulholland and Christine Kurtz 
appeal a decision of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania rendered during trial, 
granting judgment as a matter of law against them on the 
claims they brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Berks 
County, Pennsylvania.
1
  For the following reasons, we will 
affirm. 
                                              
1
 Appellants originally brought their suit against not 
only Berks County, but also Berks County Children and 
Youth Services and its executive director, George Kovarie, in 
his official capacity.  The District Court granted summary 
 3 
 
I. Background
2
 
 
 A. The July 1996 Incident 
 
In July 1996, Mulholland and Kurtz, who consider 
themselves married under the common law, were separated.
3
  
They agreed that on the night of July 6, 1996, their twelve-
year-old daughter, Linda Kurtz, who was visiting from Texas 
where she lived with Kurtz‟s mother, would stay at 
Mulholland‟s apartment.  Linda called Kurtz that evening and 
said that Mulholland was drunk and was making her feel 
uncomfortable.  Kurtz promptly called the police and went to 
pick up Linda.  When the police arrived at Mulholland‟s 
apartment, they interviewed Linda.  A police report from that 
night contains a statement from Linda that Mulholland 
                                                                                                     
judgment as to the claims against the agency and Kovarie, but 
it denied summary judgment for Berks County.  Appellants 
do not appeal the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment, see infra note 12, and this opinion accordingly 
addresses only the subsequent trial involving the remaining 
claims against the County. 
2
 In accordance with our standard of review, see infra 
note 13, we set forth the facts in the light most favorable to 
Appellants.  See Macleary v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081, 1083 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (holding that judgment as a matter of law is proper 
“only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party, there is no question of material fact for 
the jury and any verdict other than the one directed would be 
erroneous under the governing law”). 
3
 At the time, Kurtz lived with Mulholland‟s brother, 
Robert Mulholland.   
 4 
 
masturbated in her presence and made sexual comments to 
her, including that he was “horny,” wanted her to “rub [his] 
private parts,” and “want[ed] to hump [her] butt.”  (App. at 
663.)  The report also indicates that the police notified 
“children services,” i.e., the Berks County Office of Children 
and Youth Services (“BCCYS”), of the incident.  (App. at 
664.) 
 
Separate from the police investigation and subsequent 
investigation by BCCYS, Kurtz filed a petition for protection 
from abuse against Mulholland in the Berks County Court of 
Common Pleas on July 8, 1996, accusing him of seeking sex 
from Linda.
4
  A protection from abuse order was entered after 
Mulholland failed to appear at two hearings.   
 
BCCYS received the report of suspected child abuse 
from the police and assigned caseworker Brandy Neider to 
investigate.  On August 2, Neider completed a document 
known as a CY-48 form, classifying Mulholland as an 
“indicated” perpetrator of child abuse, and she sent it to 
Pennsylvania‟s statewide child abuse registry.  That registry, 
known as ChildLine, is operated and maintained by the 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”).5  
                                              
4
 In 2009, Kurtz testified in the present action that she 
had made up the charge that Mulholland had made sexually 
inappropriate remarks to Linda, and that she did so to ensure 
that “he couldn‟t get visits anymore.”  (App. at 165.) 
5
 A county agency, like BCCYS, may render three 
conclusions by sending a CY-48 form to DPW: namely, that 
the allegations of child abuse are “founded,” “indicated,” or 
“unfounded.”  A “founded” report is appropriate “if there has 
been any judicial adjudication based on a finding that a child 
 5 
 
Neider stated in her report that Linda “made consistent and 
believable statements to [a] caseworker and [a] collateral 
source,” and confirmed the statements she had made to the 
police regarding Mulholland‟s inappropriate behavior.  (App. 
at 674.)  The report also indicated that when Kurtz arrived at 
the apartment to retrieve Linda, she saw Mulholland “in 
bikini underwear with an erection.”  (App. at 674.)  Neider 
noted that Mulholland “did not respond to [a] request for [an] 
interview.”6  (App. at 673-74.)  Based on the CY-48 form, 
Mulholland was listed on ChildLine as an “indicated” 
perpetrator of child abuse. 
                                                                                                     
who is a subject of the report has been abused, including the 
entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or a finding of 
guilt to a criminal charge involving the same factual 
circumstances involved in the allegation of child abuse.”  23 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6303.  An “indicated” report is 
appropriate “if an investigation by the county agency or the 
Department of Public Welfare determines that substantial 
evidence of the alleged abuse exists based on any of the 
following: (1) Available medical evidence.  (2) The child 
protective service investigation.  (3) An admission of the acts 
of abuse by the perpetrator.”  Id.  “[S]ubstantial evidence” is 
“[e]vidence which outweighs inconsistent evidence and 
which a reasonable person would accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.”  Id.  An “unfounded” report is one that 
is not “founded” or “indicated.”  Id. 
6
 As discussed below, Neider has no recollection of the 
1996 investigation, and she based her testimony in 2009 
solely on the CY-48 form.  In contrast, witnesses from the 
Mulholland–Kurtz family, including Linda, testified in 2009 
that no one from BCCYS ever interviewed Linda. 
 6 
 
Mulholland was arrested and charged on July 6, 1996, 
with indecent exposure and endangering the welfare of a 
child.  The complaint was later amended to include a 
harassment charge.  Mulholland pled guilty on September 24, 
1996, to the harassment charge, for which he paid a $50 fine, 
and the remaining charges were dismissed.
7
     
 
B. Subsequent Contacts with BCCYS 
 
In the years following the July 1996 incident, the 
Mulholland–Kurtz family had further encounters with 
BCCYS.  In 1998, Linda ran away from her grandmother‟s 
home in Texas, where she was still living at the time.  When 
she arrived at the bus terminal in Reading, Pennsylvania, she 
called Mulholland and asked him to pick her up.  Mulholland 
retrieved her from the bus station, called BCCYS, and agreed 
to put her in a shelter until she could be returned to Texas.  A 
BCCYS caseworker told Linda that she could not see her 
father because “he did something with [her].”  (App. at 116-
17.)  According to her 2009 trial testimony in this action, 
Linda denied the allegation at the time, but the caseworker 
“said she did not care and [did not] want to hear it.”  (App. at 
117.) 
 
In 1999, Mulholland‟s and Kurtz‟s then-teenage son 
Irvin was adjudicated delinquent for raping his younger 
cousin.  In connection with that incident, BCCYS proposed a 
family service plan in which it identified Mulholland as a 
“perpetrator.”  Mulholland and Kurtz, who had resumed 
                                              
7
 Appellants insisted at the trial in this case in 2009 
that Mulholland pled guilty to harassing Christine Kurtz, not 
Linda Kurtz.   
 7 
 
living together, refused the agency‟s services.  In response to 
the family service plan, a lawyer representing Mulholland and 
Kurtz sent a letter to BCCYS, stating: 
 
[Y]our documentation refers to Mr. Mulholland 
as being a “perpetrator.” …  It appears that you 
are insinuating that there has been sexual abuse 
committed by Mr. Mulholland.  This allegation 
and reference is unfounded and you should 
immediately cease and desist from any such 
reference and delete any such reference from 
you[r] records. 
(App. at 561.)  Several days later, the lawyer sent a second 
letter to BCCYS threatening that, if any BCCYS record 
containing allegations of sexual abuse was not immediately 
expunged, Mulholland would take legal action.  BCCYS 
never responded to either letter, and Mulholland took no 
further action.   
 
On August 27, 2003, a BCCYS caseworker visited 
Appellants‟ home to inquire about a child of Brenda Heddy‟s.  
Heddy is Kurtz‟s sister-in-law and had, along with her six 
children, moved in with Mulholland and Kurtz.  The 
caseworker concluded that the children were safe since all 
adults in the home (Heddy, Kurtz, and Mulholland) 
understood that Barry Kurtz, Sr., the children‟s father, was 
not allowed to be alone with any of the children because he 
was listed as an indicated perpetrator of child abuse on 
ChildLine.  The caseworker gave no indication that 
Mulholland himself was similarly listed on ChildLine.  A 
BCCYS caseworker visited the home again in October 2005 
and again concluded that all children in the home were safe.   
 8 
 
Mulholland contacted BCCYS in September 2006, 
after Kurtz took their granddaughter S.G. away from the 
home of the child‟s parents, Irvin and his girlfriend, who, in 
Kurtz‟s view, were neglecting S.G.  A BCCYS caseworker 
visited Mulholland‟s and Kurtz‟s home on September 23, 
2006, and determined that S.G. could stay there over the 
weekend.  No indication was given that Mulholland might 
pose a threat to the children‟s safety. 
 
On September 29, 2006, Mulholland and Kurtz 
appeared before a judge of the Berks County Court of 
Common Pleas.  In the presence of multiple BCCYS 
employees, the judge issued an order granting temporary 
custody of S.G. to Kurtz.  When Mulholland and Kurtz 
returned home with S.G. that evening, however, they 
encountered a group of BCCYS caseworkers and police 
officers.  Following the custody proceeding, BCCYS had 
obtained an emergency court order to remove Mulholland‟s 
and Kurtz‟s two teenage children, Heddy‟s children, and S.G. 
from the home, based on Mulholland‟s listing on ChildLine 
as an indicated perpetrator of child abuse.  Mulholland‟s and 
Kurtz‟s children were returned to Kurtz approximately six 
weeks later, after Kurtz moved into a separate residence.  The 
Heddy children were not returned to the care of Heddy and 
Kurtz until June 2008.
8
   
 
                                              
8
 The record does not indicate whether S.G. was ever 
returned to Kurtz‟s custody.  Appellants note in their opening 
brief only that “S.G. has since been adopted and has no 
further involvement with Appellants or Appellee.”  
(Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 15 n.6.) 
 9 
 
Mulholland and Kurtz later testified that they were not 
told of Mulholland‟s listing on ChildLine until March 2007 
and that prior to that time they were unaware of the listing.  
That claim is puzzling not only because Mulholland, through 
counsel, had responded in 1999 to a BCCYS statement that he 
was a child abuse “perpetrator,” but also because the 
confrontation with BCCYS caseworkers and the police in 
September 2006 should surely have given Mulholland and 
Kurtz some idea of Mulholland‟s ChildLine listing.  
Nevertheless, they say that, upon first becoming aware of the 
ChildLine listing in March 2007, they took steps to remove 
him from the registry.  The criminal charges of indecent 
exposure and endangering the welfare of a child, which had 
been dismissed in 1996 but remained on Mulholland‟s 
criminal record, were expunged on May 4, 2007, via a court 
order.  By the time Mulholland attempted to appeal his 
ChildLine listing in late 2007, BCCYS had destroyed its 
records of the 1996 investigation pursuant to a provision of 
the Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”) 
that requires county agencies to destroy all records about a 
child when he or she reaches the age of twenty-three.
9
  
                                              
9
 The CPSL provides that “all information which 
identifies the subjects of founded and indicated child abuse 
reports shall be expunged when the subject child reaches the 
age of 23.”  23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6338(b).  DPW is to 
establish a “subfile” in ChildLine, however, “to indefinitely 
retain the names of perpetrators of child abuse … if the 
individual‟s Social Security number or date of birth is known 
to the department.”  23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6338(c).  It is 
unclear from the record why Neider‟s 1996 CY-48 form 
survived the mandated destruction. 
 10 
 
Mulholland did not appeal his ChildLine listing until shortly 
after Linda had turned twenty-three.   
 
In 2008, DPW‟s Bureau of Hearings and Appeals10 
found that DPW had not sent notice to Mulholland in 1996 at 
the time he was listed on ChildLine, and it ordered a hearing 
on the merits.  At the merits hearing, BCCYS argued that 
Mulholland‟s status should be changed from “indicated” 
perpetrator to “founded” perpetrator because he had pled 
guilty to the harassment charge arising from the July 1996 
incident.
11
  By order dated March 2, 2009, however, the 
                                              
10
 Under the CPSL, the secretary of DPW may, at any 
time, “amend or expunge any record [made pursuant to the 
CPSL] upon good cause shown.”  23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6341(a)(1).  “[W]ithin 45 days of being notified of the 
status of the report,” a “person named as a perpetrator … in 
an indicated report of child abuse may … request the 
secretary [of DPW] to amend or expunge an indicated report 
on the grounds that it is inaccurate or it is being maintained in 
a manner inconsistent with [the CPSL].”  Id. § 6341(a)(2).  If 
the secretary grants the request, the relevant “county agency 
and any subject have 45 days in which to file an 
administrative appeal with the secretary.”  Id. § 6341(b).  If 
the secretary denies the request, the individual has a right to a 
hearing before DPW‟s Bureau of Hearings and Appeals.  Id. 
§ 6341(c); 55 Pa. Code § 3490.106a.  The decision of the 
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals may be appealed to a state 
court.  2 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 702; 55 Pa. Code 
§ 3490.106a(e). 
11
 As previously noted, supra note 5, the CPSL 
provides that allegations of child sexual abuse are “founded” 
where there is a “finding of guilt to a criminal charge 
 11 
 
Bureau of Hearings and Appeals adopted the recommendation 
of an administrative law judge who found that no substantial 
evidence existed to maintain Mulholland‟s listing on 
ChildLine as even an indicated perpetrator of child abuse.  
The decision was affirmed upon reconsideration by DPW and 
on appeal to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.  The 
ChildLine listing was expunged as of July 23, 2010.   
 
C. Trial and Procedural History 
 
On October 25, 2010, Mulholland and Kurtz brought 
suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania against Berks County, BCCYS, and BCCYS 
Executive Director George Kovarie in his official capacity.  
The District Court granted the defendants‟ motion for 
summary judgment as to the claims against BCCYS and 
Kovarie.
12
 Mulholland‟s and Kurtz‟s remaining claims 
against Berks County proceeded to trial.  They claimed that 
the County was liable for BCCYS violations of their 
procedural and substantive due process rights.  More 
specifically, the claims at trial were that the County was liable 
for (1) failing to conduct an adequate investigation before 
                                                                                                     
involving the same factual circumstances involved in the 
allegation of child abuse.”  23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6303. 
12
 With respect to BCCYS, the Court reasoned that, for 
purposes of § 1983 liability, a county agency is not a legally 
separate entity from the county itself, and any actions by the 
agency are imputed to the county.  As for Kovarie, the Court 
concluded that a lawsuit against public officers in their 
official capacities is functionally a suit against the public 
entity that employs them.   
 12 
 
reporting Mulholland to ChildLine as an indicated perpetrator 
of child abuse; (2) failing to notify Mulholland of BCCYS‟s 
recommendation to list him as an indicated perpetrator of 
child abuse on ChildLine; (3) failing to update ChildLine with 
exculpatory information, namely, that (a) the child sex abuse 
charges against Mulholland were eventually dropped and he 
pled guilty only to harassing Christine Kurtz, (b) Linda 
recanted her allegations against Mulholland to a BCCYS 
caseworker in 1998, and (c) Mulholland denied through his 
attorney in 1999 that he was a “perpetrator”; (4) removing 
Mulholland‟s and Kurtz‟s children and grandchild and the 
Heddy children from their home in 2006; and (5) attempting 
to change Mulholland‟s status from “indicated” to “founded” 
during the appeals process.   
 
At trial, Appellants presented the testimony of various 
family members, including Mulholland, Kurtz, and Linda.  
All three testified that nothing warranting a child services 
investigation occurred that consequential evening of July 6, 
1996 – that Mulholland never made any statements or took 
any actions of a sexual nature.  Linda even claimed that she 
could not “recall saying anything to anyone that indicated 
[that her] father did anything or said anything sexual.”  (App. 
at 113.) 
 
They also testified that neither BCCYS nor the police 
ever contacted them to investigate the incident.  Linda 
testified, for example, that she never spoke with the police or 
any caseworker from BCCYS, including Neider.  Mulholland 
and Kurtz further testified that they did not recall ever 
receiving notice from BCCYS or DPW regarding 
Mulholland‟s placement on ChildLine.  In fact, they 
reaffirmed, they had no clue that Mulholland had been listed 
 13 
 
on ChildLine until March 2007 when BCCYS finally 
provided the reason for taking the children from their home. 
 
In her testimony, Kurtz sought to downplay evidence 
that she herself had accused Mulholland of inappropriate 
behavior toward Linda in July 1996.  She insisted that she 
filed a petition for protection from abuse against Mulholland 
only because he broke his word by getting drunk in front of 
Linda and her brother, and because she interpreted Linda‟s 
statement that Mulholland had made her “uncomfortable” to 
mean that he “was making remarks … about” Kurtz.  (App. at 
165.)  That made her “mad,” she testified, so she “put down 
that [Mulholland] was talking dirty to [Linda],” even though 
it was not true, so “he couldn‟t get visits anymore.”  (App. at 
165.)  In addition, Mulholland testified that he understood 
that he had pled guilty to harassing Kurtz in September 1996, 
not Linda.   
 
Appellants also called two BCCYS employees, George 
Kovarie and Brandy Neider, to testify.  Each testified 
regarding BCCYS‟s policies and customs, and Neider 
testified about her involvement in the 1996 investigation by 
BCCYS.  Neider, who at the time of trial was the director of 
BCCYS‟s intake services department, had been a caseworker 
in 1996 in the sexual abuse unit.  Although she had no 
independent recollection of her investigation in Linda‟s case, 
Neider relied on the existing documentation of the 
investigation to testify that she had indeed interviewed Linda.  
In particular, in the CY-48 form, Neider said that Linda 
“made consistent and believable statements” that Mulholland 
had engaged in the alleged inappropriate behavior.  (App. at 
674.)  The form also stated that Mulholland “did not respond 
to [a] request for [an] interview.”  (Id.)  Neider testified that 
 14 
 
the existing documentation was consistent with her usual 
investigation practices, and she indicated that, under identical 
circumstances today, she would still conclude that the report 
of sexual abuse against Mulholland was “indicated.”   
 
Regarding BCCYS‟s policies and customs, both 
Kovarie and Neider said that the mission of BCCYS is to 
protect children and to preserve family integrity as provided 
by the CPSL.  Each caseworker reports to a supervisor, who 
in turn reports to a departmental director.  Newly hired 
BCCYS caseworkers go through 120 hours of training on all 
of the agency‟s functions, before they are certified for direct 
service with families.  They also receive a minimum of 
twenty hours of training each year.  Neider, as the director of 
intake services, develops and applies policies and procedures 
in that area.  She testified that BCCYS, as a matter of policy, 
follows the child abuse investigation and reporting 
requirements of the CPSL and accompanying regulations.   
 
Neider also testified that, although the CPSL does not 
require it, BCCYS has an internal policy of sending a letter to 
alleged perpetrators at the conclusion of an investigation, at 
the same time it submits the CY-48 form to ChildLine, to 
provide notice of the agency‟s status determination.  BCCYS 
caseworkers receive training in sending out such notices.  
Neider testified that she could not recall any other situation in 
which an individual had complained about not receiving a 
notice from BCCYS.   
 
With respect to BCCYS‟s statutory duty to provide 
supplemental information to ChildLine even after an 
 15 
 
indicated report has been submitted,
13
 Neider testified that 
BCCYS has a policy of submitting so-called CY-49 forms to 
report birth dates, Social Security numbers, or additional 
evidence of abuse, but not to report exculpatory information.  
Accordingly, as Neider described the policy, BCCYS does 
not submit a CY-49 form when an alleged victim of abuse 
later recants or when an alleged perpetrator denies culpability.  
Instead, BCCYS leaves it to the appeals process provided by 
the CPSL to determine whether a report status should be 
changed to “unfounded.”   
 
Kovarie, the director of BCCYS, testified that 
individual caseworkers lack the authority to unilaterally 
remove children from a home.  Rather, BCCYS must first 
petition a court for an order requiring the removal of the 
children, and, before it files such a petition, BCCYS complies 
with an internal policy that at least three BCCYS supervisors 
must review and sign off on the petition.  Kovarie testified 
that this process was followed when BCCYS decided to 
petition the juvenile court for the removal of children from 
Appellants‟ home.   
 
After Appellants rested their case-in-chief, Berks 
County moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 
                                              
13
 For founded and indicated reports, Pennsylvania law 
requires that the county agency shall submit a “supplemental 
child abuse report form,” known as a CY-49 form, “when 
additional case information is obtained, including dates of 
birth, identity of the subjects, additional information about the 
nature of the abuse, or the case is presented before a court and 
there is a change in the status of the report.”  55 Pa. Code 
§ 3490.67(d). 
 16 
 
50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  As discussed 
in greater detail below, the Court granted that motion, and 
this timely appeal followed. 
 
II. Discussion
14
 
 
Mulholland and Kurtz reassert on appeal their claim 
                                              
14
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  Rule 50(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
If a party has  been fully heard on an issue 
during a jury trial and the court finds that a 
reasonable jury would not have a legally 
sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party 
on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the 
issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion 
for judgment as a matter of law against the 
party on a claim or defense that, under the 
controlling law, can be maintained or defeated 
only with a favorable finding on that issue. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1).  Our review of a district court‟s grant 
of judgment as a matter of law is plenary.  See Lightning 
Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).  
A motion for judgment as a matter of law under rule 50(a) 
will be granted “only if, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no question 
of material fact for the jury and any verdict other than the one 
directed would be erroneous under the governing law.”  
Macleary v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081, 1083 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 17 
 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Berks County is liable for 
violating their procedural and substantive due process rights.  
Section 1983 provides: 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States … to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
the party injured in an action at law … . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 
“When a suit against a municipality is based on 
§ 1983, the municipality can only be liable when the alleged 
constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, 
regulation or decision officially adopted by the governing 
body or informally adopted by custom.”  Beck v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Monell v. 
N.Y. City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).  In 
other words, the County may not be held liable for 
constitutional torts under § 1983 on a vicarious liability 
theory rooted in respondeat superior, Andrews v. City of 
Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990), but “it can be 
held responsible as an entity when the injury inflicted is 
permitted under its adopted policy or custom.”  Beck, 89 F.3d 
at 971. 
 
Based on the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in the 
landmark Monell case, courts have recognized a “two-path 
track to municipal liability under § 1983, depending on 
 18 
 
whether the allegation is based on municipal policy or 
custom.”  Beck, 89 F.3d at 971. 
 
Policy is made when a “decisionmaker 
possess[ing] final authority to establish 
municipal policy with respect to the action” 
issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.  
A course of conduct is considered to be a 
“custom” when, though not authorized by law, 
“such practices of state officials [are] so 
permanent and well-settled” as to virtually 
constitute law. 
Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1480 (citations omitted) (alterations in 
original).  “Custom … may also be established by evidence of 
knowledge and acquiescence.”  Beck, 89 F.3d at 971. 
 
An official has policymaking authority for Monell 
purposes when the official is responsible as a matter of state 
law for making policy in the particular area of county 
business in question, and the official‟s authority to make 
policy in that area is final and unreviewable.  Hill v. Borough 
of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
Thus, to establish municipal liability under § 1983, 
Appellants must show that they were deprived of “rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws,”15 and that the deprivation of those rights was the result 
                                              
15
 It is well-settled that, if there is no violation in the 
first place, there can be no derivative municipal claim.  See, 
e.g., Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (if a 
municipal employee “inflicted no constitutional injury … , it 
 19 
 
of an official government policy or custom.  Using that 
framework, we analyze each of Appellants‟ constitutional 
claims. 
 
A. Procedural Due Process Claims 
 
Mulholland and Kurtz contend that the District Court 
erroneously granted judgment against them on their 
procedural due process claims against Berks County.  “To 
state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due 
process rights, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived 
of an individual interest that is encompassed within the 
Fourteenth Amendment‟s protection of „life, liberty, or 
property,‟ and (2) the procedures available to him did not 
provide „due process of law.‟”  Hill, 455 F.3d at 233-34.  To 
determine what process is due in a particular situation, courts 
consider three factors: first, the private interest at stake; 
second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest 
through the procedures used and the probable value of 
different procedures; and third, the government‟s interest.  
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  “The 
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”  
Id. at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted).  To sustain a 
claim under § 1983 based on a violation of procedural due 
process, Mulholland and Kurtz “must, at a minimum, prove 
recklessness or „gross negligence‟ and in some instance may 
                                                                                                     
is inconceivable that [the municipality] could be liable”); 
Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“[T]he initial question in a section 1983 action is whether the 
plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at 
all.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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be required to show a „deliberate decision to deprive‟ the 
plaintiff of due process.”  Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien 
& Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1277 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
 1. Inadequate Investigation 
 
Appellants point out that, on one hand, multiple 
members of the Mulholland–Kurtz family “testified 
consistently that there was no investigation” (Appellants‟ 
Opening Br. at 40 (emphasis omitted)), that in fact “no one 
involved was ever contacted or interviewed directly by 
BCCYS and/or Neider” regarding the 1996 incident (id. at 
40-41).  On the other hand, Neider, “[w]ith no independent 
recollection of her investigation, and relying solely on the 
CY48 form,” claimed at trial that she spoke to Linda at the 
time of the July 1996 incident.  (Id. at 40.)  Based on that 
conflicting testimony, Appellants argue, “[i]t was up to the 
jury to decide whether BCCYS‟[s] investigation was 
constitutionally adequate.”  (Id. at 41.) 
 
The District Court declined to decide whether 
BCCYS‟s investigation was inadequate such that it violated 
Mulholland‟s procedural due process rights.  Instead, the 
Court found that “[t]here is no evidence that BCCYS has a 
policy or custom of conducting inadequate investigations into 
allegations of child abuse.”  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 18.)  To the 
contrary, the only evidence presented in Mulholland‟s and 
Kurtz‟s case-in-chief was that “BCCYS has a policy of 
complying with the procedures set forth by the CPSL.”16  
                                              
16
 Those procedures include: interviewing, if possible, 
“those persons who are known to have or may reasonably be 
expected to have, information relating to the incident of 
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(Id.)  Thus, the Court determined that even if BCCYS‟s 
investigation was inadequate, it cannot be said to have been 
influenced by some “policy or custom of BCCYS.”  (Id.) 
 
The District Court was correct.  Without more, Berks 
County, the municipality of which BCCYS is simply an 
agency, cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a single 
caseworker‟s alleged deviation from the requirements of the 
CPSL.  See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 
1478 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Supervisory liability cannot be based 
solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior … .”).  There 
is no evidence that BCCYS employs a policy or has a custom 
of conducting desultory investigations, and the District Court 
correctly declined to subject Berks County to municipal 
liability for that claim. 
 
 2. Failure to Provide Notice at the   
   Conclusion of the Investigation 
 
The District Court ruled as a matter of law against 
Appellants‟ claim that the County, through BCCYS, violated 
their constitutional rights by failing to notify Mulholland of 
his listing on ChildLine, because the “CPSL allocates the 
responsibility for providing notice of a ChildLine listing to 
                                                                                                     
suspected child abuse,” including “[t]he child, if appropriate,” 
“[t]he child‟s parents,” and “[t]he alleged perpetrator of the 
suspected child abuse,” 55 Pa. Code § 3490.55(d); and 
notifying “the subject” of a report of child abuse “who is 
about to be interviewed of the existence of the report, the 
subject‟s rights,” and his “rights pursuant to [the CPSL] in 
regard to amendment or expungement,” 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 6368(a). 
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the Department of Public Welfare, not the county agency.”  
(D. Ct. Op. at 15 (citing 55 Pa. Code §§ 3490.40, 3490.40a).)  
In so holding, the Court acknowledged that DPW‟s “Bureau 
of Hearings and Appeals found that Mulholland did not 
receive proper notice from [DPW], which is not a party in this 
case,” but the Court held that the County “cannot be held 
liable for [DPW‟s] failure to send proper notice.”  (D. Ct. Op. 
at 15.)  The Court noted that BCCYS‟s policy of notifying 
alleged child abuse perpetrators of the results of an 
investigation “goes beyond what the CPSL requires.”  (D. Ct. 
Op. at 18.)  And “[t]here is no evidence that BCCYS has a 
widespread practice of failing to provide notice in accordance 
with its internal policy.”  (D. Ct. Op. at 18-19.)  The only 
testimony about the notification practice at BCCYS was 
provided by Neider, who “testified that she could not recall 
another situation in which an individual claimed not to have 
received notice from BCCYS.”  (D. Ct. Op. at 19.) 
 
We agree.  Not only does the statutory duty to inform 
an individual that he is to be listed on ChildLine fall upon 
DPW and not BCCYS, see 55 Pa. Code § 3490.40 (providing 
that ChildLine shall provide notice to an individual that an 
“indicated report[] of child abuse [has been] entered into the 
Statewide Central Register”), but, even if BCCYS were 
responsible for notifying alleged predators, a one-time failure 
to do so would not subject the County to municipal liability 
under § 1983 because it does not show that the failure 
resulted from an agency policy or custom.  The only evidence 
regarding the BCCYS practice in that regard shows instead 
that the agency consistently complied with its internal policy 
of notifying the subject of a report of child abuse of the result 
of its investigation.  The District Court thus correctly ruled 
against Appellants on that claim. 
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 3. Failure to Update ChildLine with   
   Exculpatory Information 
 
Mulholland and Kurtz argue that the County violated 
their procedural due process rights by failing to update 
ChildLine when BCCYS became aware of information that 
cast doubt on the child abuse allegations against Mulholland.  
The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that this claim 
was based on an actual BCCYS policy, as opposed to the 
allegedly unconstitutional actions of an isolated employee.  
Neider testified that BCCYS has a policy of submitting CY-
49 forms to ChildLine to report birth dates, Social Security 
numbers, or additional evidence of abuse, but not to report 
exculpatory information, including denials and recantations.  
Accordingly, BCCYS does not submit a CY-49 form when an 
alleged victim of abuse later recants or when an alleged 
perpetrator denies culpability after BCCYS‟s investigation 
has concluded.  Instead, BCCYS leaves it to DPW‟s appeals 
process to determine whether a report status should be 
changed.   
 
Despite BCCYS‟s policy, the District Court rejected 
Appellants‟ Monell claim because Appellants did not offer 
“any support for their view that the Due Process Clause 
requires a county agency to report exculpatory information 
after it has completed its investigation and submitted a report 
to ChildLine.”  (D. Ct. Op. at 16.)  The District Court went on 
to say that, “[g]iven that the CPSL provides for notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard through the appeals 
process, [there is] no basis for imposing on county agencies 
an additional constitutional burden to update upon receiving 
exculpatory information.”  (D. Ct. Op. at 16.) 
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That is entirely correct.  “The fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”  Mathews, 424 
U.S. at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The essence 
of Appellants‟ claim regarding exculpatory information is that 
BCCYS‟s policy denied them their opportunity to have that 
new information made of record.  But the process provided by 
the CPSL allows a subject of a report of child abuse the 
opportunity to air new information at a meaningful time and 
in a meaningful manner,
17
 and due process does not require 
more.
18
  That holds true even if we give full credit to 
Mulholland‟s claim that he did not receive notice of his 
                                              
17
 See 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6341(a) (providing 
that, “[a]t any time,” (1) the secretary of DPW “may amend 
or expunge any record under this chapter upon good cause 
shown and notice to the appropriate subjects of the report,” 
and (2) “[a]ny person named as a perpetrator … in an 
indicated report of child abuse may, within 45 days of being 
notified of the status of the report, request the secretary [of 
DPW] to amend or expunge an indicated report on the 
grounds that it is inaccurate or it is being maintained in a 
manner inconsistent with this chapter”). 
18
 We note, in addition, that denials and recantations 
are notoriously unreliable, see United States v. Provost, 969 
F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting, in context of motion 
for new criminal trial, that “the skepticism about recantations 
is especially applicable in cases of child sexual abuse where 
recantation is a recurring phenomenon”), and the CPSL‟s 
appeals process provides an appropriate mechanism for 
measuring the reliability of such evidence in a full and fair 
way. 
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ChildLine listing.  As we have explained, see supra Part 
II.A.2, the blame for failing to notify Mulholland lies with 
DPW, not with Berks County.  The County cannot be faulted 
for relying on the statutory notice and appeals process when 
the alleged breakdown in that process occurred at the hands 
of a state agency.
19
 
                                              
19
 Mathews provides further support for the conclusion 
that BCCYS‟s policy did not result in a violation of 
Appellants‟ procedural due process rights.  Neider testified 
that in the course of her career – over 750 investigations and 
counting – she could not recall a single instance, other than 
this case, of a person listed on ChildLine complaining of a 
lack of notice.  Given that each notice was required by statute 
to inform the subject of his right to appeal his listing, see 23 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6338(a) (providing that notice “shall 
also inform the recipient of his right, within 45 days after 
being notified of the status of the report, to appeal an 
indicated report, and his right to a hearing if the request is 
denied”); see also 55 Pa. Code § 3490.40 (notice shall inform 
subject of “right to request the Secretary [of DPW] to amend 
or expunge the report”), BCCYS‟s policy did not create a risk 
of erroneous deprivation of a subject‟s familial due process 
rights.  See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (noting that “due 
process generally requires consideration of,” among other 
things, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [due process] 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”).  Because 
notice is indeed provided in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, BCCYS reasonably left it to the appeals process to 
work out denials and recantations. 
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B. Substantive Due Process Claims 
 
In addition to their procedural due process claims, 
Mulholland and Kurtz raised two substantive due process 
claims, both of which the District Court rejected.  To 
establish a substantive due process violation by a 
municipality, a plaintiff must show that executive action was 
“so ill-conceived or malicious that it shocks the conscience.”  
Miller v. City of Phila., 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Specifically, a child 
welfare agency abridges an individual‟s substantive due 
process rights when its actions “exceed both negligence and 
deliberate indifference, and reach a level of gross negligence 
or arbitrariness that indeed „shocks the conscience.‟”  Id. at 
375-76; see also B.S. v. Somerset Cnty. Children and Youth 
Servs., __ F.3d __, __ (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A] substantive due 
process claim requires decision-making by a social worker 
that is so clearly arbitrary … [that it] can properly be said to 
„shock the conscience.‟” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alterations in original)). 
 
That standard is met if the child is removed without 
“an objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse,” based on the 
information available at the time.  Croft v. Westmoreland 
Cnty. Children and Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123, 1126 (3d 
Cir. 1997).  “Absent such reasonable grounds, governmental 
intrusions of this type are arbitrary abuses of power.”  Id.  
That is because “a state has no interest in protecting children 
from their parents unless it has some reasonable and 
articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that 
a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse.”  
Id.  Reasonable suspicion is lacking when a child welfare 
agency has “consciously disregarded a great risk that there 
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had been no abuse.”  Ziccardi v. City of Phila., 288 F.3d 57, 
66 (3d Cir. 2002).
20
 
                                              
20
 Mulholland and Kurtz framed one of their 
procedural due process claims – that BCCYS failed to update 
ChildLine with exculpatory information – as a substantive 
due process claim as well.  Appellants alleged that BCCYS‟s 
policy of not supplementing ChildLine with exculpatory 
information represented a conscious disregard of a known 
risk – i.e., that parental rights would be violated as a result of 
an individual‟s unjust placement on ChildLine. 
The District Court granted judgment against that 
claim, holding that BCCYS‟s policy “was not „so clearly 
arbitrary‟ as to shock the conscience” (D. Ct. Op. at 16 
(quoting Miller, 174 F.3d at 376)), both because Mulholland 
and Kurtz “did not establish that BCCYS was actually aware 
that two of the charges against Mulholland had been 
dismissed or that Linda was not the victim of the harassment 
charge to which Mulholland pled guilty,” and because 
“Mulholland‟s denial of culpability and Linda‟s recantation 
approximately two years after the July 1996 incident were not 
sufficient to undermine an objectively reasonable suspicion of 
abuse.”  (D. Ct. Op. at 16-17.) 
We affirm that holding of the District Court for two 
reasons.  First, recantations in the child abuse context are, as 
already noted, supra note 18, rightly viewed with skepticism.  
Second, the policy does not represent a conscious disregard of 
a known risk, given that DPW is required by law to notify 
individuals of their placement on ChildLine and of their right 
to appeal.  There is no evidence of any other case in which 
DPW failed to provide notice, and the CPSL‟s appeals 
process provides an avenue for the sort of denials and 
 28 
 
1. Removal of Mulholland’s and Kurtz’s 
Children and Grandchild 
Appellants contend that the removal of their children 
and grandchild from their home in 2006 violated their 
substantive due process rights.
21
  The District Court denied 
that claim as a matter of law because, although “municipal 
liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal 
policymakers under appropriate circumstances,” McGreevy v. 
Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 368 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), “Plaintiffs offered no proof at trial that an 
individual with policymaking authority actually reviewed the 
petition that led to the September 29, 2006 court order.”  (D. 
Ct. Op. at 20.)  The Court held, therefore, that Appellants 
“have not established that BCCYS‟s role in the removal of 
their children and grandchild[] from their home was pursuant 
to an official policy or custom” (id.), and it declined to 
address whether Appellants‟ underlying constitutional claim 
had merit. 
                                                                                                     
recantations Appellants raise.  23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6341.  
BCCYS was thus not deliberately indifferent to a known risk.  
Rather, the agency reasonably relied on the CPSL-mandated 
notice and the appeals process to identify meritorious denials 
and recantations. 
21
 They also insist that the County deprived them of 
their due process rights when it removed the Heddy children 
from the home.  That right, they argue, existed because Kurtz 
provided substantial care to the Heddy children.  But we have 
never held that an aunt possesses a substantive due process 
interest in rearing her nieces and nephews when the children‟s 
biological mother is already carrying out that responsibility, 
and we decline to recognize any such interest in this case. 
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Mulholland and Kurtz argue that that holding is 
“nonsensical.”  (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 36.)  They point 
to the testimony of George Kovarie, who testified that 
petitions to remove children from a home are made by a 
three-person petition review committee, and they assert that 
the committee in this case must have comprised “final 
decision makers.”  (Id. at 27.)  The committee‟s actions, they 
say, thus represented “an official act of the agency.”  (Id. at 
27-28.) 
 
As to the merits of their due process claim, Appellants 
contend that “[t]here was no reason or articulable evidence” 
at the time the children were removed from the home that the 
children “were being abused.”  (Id. at 36.)  In fact, they 
contend, “BCCYS‟s own investigations in 2003, 2005 and 
2006 demonstrated” that there was no risk of harm to the 
children, and the removal of the children from the family 
home in September of 2006 was therefore made without an 
“objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse.”  (Id. at 36-37.)  
In their view, BCCYS‟s decision to remove the children from 
the home was thus “an arbitrary abuse of power that shocks 
the conscience” (id. at 37), and was made without any 
reasonable suspicion that child abuse was occurring in the 
home. 
 
We disagree with Appellants‟ characterization of 
BCCYS‟s efforts in this case, and likewise disagree with their 
conclusions.  “[T]he initial question in a section 1983 action 
is whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a 
constitutional right at all.”  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 
F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Here, BCCYS had reasonable suspicion that, given 
Mulholland‟s listing on ChildLine as an indicated perpetrator 
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of child abuse, the children were at sufficient risk to justify 
seeking their removal. 
 
This case is much different than Croft, upon which 
Appellants principally rely to argue that Mulholland‟s listing 
on ChildLine was insufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion 
of child abuse.  In Croft, we held that a child services agency 
lacked “objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse” justifying 
the forced separation of a father from his wife and child, 
when the only evidence of abuse was a “six-fold hearsay 
report by an anonymous informant” and when the father, 
mother, and daughter all provided consistent and credible 
statements that no abuse had occurred.  Croft, 103 F.3d at 
1126.  Absent reasonable suspicion, we held that 
“governmental intrusions of this type are arbitrary abuses of 
power.”  Id. 
 
Unlike the anonymous and vague report of child abuse 
against the father in Croft, the report against Mulholland in 
1996 was based on specific, credible, contemporaneous, and 
mutually consistent evidence, including interviews with then-
twelve-year-old Linda Kurtz, who said that Mulholland  
masturbated in her presence and sexually propositioned her.  
BCCYS‟s suspicions were accordingly much more concrete 
than those of the child services agency in Croft.  What‟s 
more, Mulholland had pled guilty to a harassment charge in 
connection with the incident and had never challenged his 
listing on ChildLine through the administrative appeals 
process provided by the CPSL, so BCCYS had no sound 
reason to disbelieve the allegations against him.
22
  This is in 
                                              
22
 We are mindful of our obligation to review the facts 
in the light most favorable to the Appellants, see supra note 
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stark contrast to Croft, where the facts available to the county 
child services agency “raised serious questions about the 
veracity” of the anonymous informant.  Croft, 103 F.3d at 
1126. 
 
Nor have Appellants provided sufficient “proof that 
the defendants consciously disregarded, not just a substantial 
risk, but a great risk” that their concern about the children 
was not well-founded.  Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 66.  Appellants 
argue that BCCYS‟s abrupt and drastic measures are so 
arbitrary as to shock the conscience, because BCCYS had had 
several interactions with Mulholland without raising concerns 
over his presence in the home.
23
  Perhaps, given the passage 
of time since Mulholland was listed on ChildLine and in light 
of the several cooperative interactions the Appellants had 
                                                                                                     
14, but even in that light the fact remains that, based on his 
arrest on July 6, 1996, Mulholland was charged with 
harassment and he pled guilty to that charge.  His claim that 
he understood the charge to reflect harassment against his 
wife does not alter the state of his criminal record.  Similarly, 
his assertion that he never received notice of his listing, even 
if true, does not make unreasonable the County‟s reliance on 
the proper operation of its and DPW‟s policies on providing 
notice. 
23
 This argument disregards, of course, the interactions 
that BCCYS had with the family in 1998 when Linda ran 
away from her grandmother‟s home and again in 1999 when 
Mulholland‟s and Kurtz‟s son was adjudicated delinquent for 
raping his younger cousin.  With respect to both of those 
interactions, BCCYS expressed concern over Mulholland‟s 
contact with his children. 
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with BCCYS, that agency could have acted in a more 
deliberate and less sudden fashion by providing Mulholland 
and Kurtz the courtesy of letting them know that it intended 
to petition the juvenile court for removal of the children.  But 
its failure to do so does not “reach a level of gross negligence 
or arbitrariness that indeed „shocks the conscience.‟”  Miller, 
174 F.3d at 375-76.  Mulholland‟s listing on ChildLine 
remained unrebutted at the time the children were removed 
from the home, and it was therefore not plainly unreasonable 
for the agency to believe he had committed child abuse and 
posed an immediate threat to the children residing with him.  
We therefore affirm the District Court‟s judgment as a matter 
of law on this substantive due process claim.
24
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 As noted above, supra at II.B.1, the District Court 
conducted a Monell analysis to dispose of this claim, holding 
that Appellants elicited no proof that the decision to petition 
the court for removal was made by an individual in a 
policymaking authority.  See McGreevy, 413 F.3d at 368 
(holding that “municipal liability may be imposed for a single 
decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate 
circumstances” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Given 
our disposition of the underlying substantive due process 
claim, however, we need not address the Monell analysis on 
which the District Court relied.  See Los Angeles v. Heller, 
475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (if a municipal employee “inflicted 
no constitutional injury … , it is inconceivable that [the 
municipality] could be liable”). 
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 2. Attempt to Change Mulholland’s Status  
   from Indicated to Founded 
 
Mulholland and Kurtz also sought to hold the County 
liable for arguing during the appeals process that 
Mulholland‟s status should be elevated in seriousness from 
“indicated” to “founded” because he pled guilty to the 
harassment charge arising from the July 1996 incident.  The 
District Court rejected that claim because there was no 
evidence adduced at trial that BCCYS‟s litigation strategy 
“represented an official policy or custom of BCCYS,” but 
rather it represented a specific position on a specific legal 
issue under facts specific to this case.  (D. Ct. Op. at 20.)  
That alone is a sufficient basis for rejecting Appellants‟ 
claim. 
 
Beyond that, the legal position BCCYS took during the 
appeals process was not so arbitrary that it shocks the 
conscience.  As a result of the allegations of child sexual 
abuse in 1996, Mulholland was charged with indecent 
exposure, endangering the welfare of a child, and harassment.  
Although the indecent exposure and child endangerment 
charges were eventually dropped, Mulholland pled guilty to 
the remaining charge of harassment.  While Appellants claim 
that Mulholland pled guilty to harassing Christine Kurtz, not 
Linda, it was not shocking for the County to believe and to 
argue that the harassment charge related to Mulholland‟s 
behavior toward Linda.  The CPSL provides that a “founded” 
report is appropriate “if there has been any judicial 
adjudication based on a finding that a child who is a subject 
of the report has been abused, including the entry of a plea of 
guilty or nolo contendere or a finding of guilt to a criminal 
charge involving the same factual circumstances involved in 
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the allegation of child abuse.”  23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6303 
(emphasis added).  Thus, it does not shock the conscience that 
BCCYS would argue that the report against Mulholland 
should be changed to “founded.”  BCCYS had a defensible 
argument that the harassment charge, to which Mulholland 
had pled, stemmed from the same factual circumstances 
surrounding Linda‟s allegations of sexual abuse. 
 
C. Appellants’ Evidentiary Claims 
 
Finally, Appellants challenge a number of evidentiary 
rulings of the District Court.
25
  We address the substance of 
only one of those challenges.  Appellants claim that the 
District Court improperly admitted into evidence the July 
1996 police report in which Linda Kurtz told police that 
Mulholland had engaged in sexually inappropriate behavior 
toward her.  According to Appellants, the police report was 
“extremely prejudicial.”  (Appellants‟ Opening Br. at 44.)   
 
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides, 
 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a 
danger of one or more of the following: unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 
                                              
25
 We review a district court‟s evidentiary decisions for 
abuse of discretion.  Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. Ebi Med. 
Sys., 181 F.3d 446, 464 (3d Cir. 1999).  To the extent the 
challenge involves a legal inquiry, such as the interpretation 
of an evidentiary rule, our review is plenary.  Barker v. Deere 
& Co., 60 F.3d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence. 
The District Court had broad discretion in its application of 
rule 403, see United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 184 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“A district court‟s ruling under Rule 403 may be 
reversed only if it is „arbitrary or irrational.‟” (quoting United 
States v. Univ. Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 665 
(3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)), and we cannot say that it abused 
that discretion when it allowed into evidence the police report 
that initiated BCCYS‟s 1996 investigation.  To the contrary, 
the probative value of the report, which described in detail the 
allegations against Mulholland that he now denies, 
substantially outweighed any prejudicial effect of the report, 
not vice versa.  In effect, Kurtz and Mulholland assert that the 
County failed to properly investigate the claim of child abuse, 
but they then argue that admission of the report that formed 
the basis of the investigation was prejudicial.  The District 
Court was well within its discretion in rejecting that 
argument.
26
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 We need not evaluate Appellants‟ remaining 
evidentiary challenges, which are (1) that the District Court 
erred in excluding certain exhibits regarding BCCYS‟s 
interactions with the Heddy family and the family of S.G.‟s 
biological mother, and (2) that the District Court should have 
excluded as irrelevant a May 1997 psychological evaluation 
of Linda during which Linda told a licensed psychiatrist that 
Mulholland “wanted [her] to do stuff to him” and “attempted 
to engage her sexually while intoxicated.”  (Appellee‟s 
Opening Br. at 43.)  Even if we were to reverse those rulings, 
Appellants‟ municipal liability claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
would still fail as a matter of law.  Cf. Democratic Party of 
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III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision 
of the District Court granting the County‟s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law. 
                                                                                                     
Washington State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1207 (9th Cir. 
2003) (declining to review appellants‟ challenges to the 
district court‟s evidentiary rulings because, “even without the 
evidence, appellants are entitled to prevail”).  Those 
challenges do not advance Appellants‟ burden of establishing 
that a BCCYS policy or custom led to the deprivation of their 
rights to due process. 
